{"id":196,"name":null,"username":"Ex_TFL","avatar_template":"/user_avatar/forum.phoenix.money/ex_tfl/{size}/92_2.png","created_at":"2026-10-19T21:37:45.379Z","cooked":"\u003cp\u003eYou reply confirms the central problem:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eYou believe your own personal judgment entitles you to withhold powers after publicly committing to transfer them\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eYour own TLA proposal specified transfer of administration after one month and transfer of contract ownership after three months\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt contained no condition requiring the board to retain your confidence\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIdentify the decision authorizing departure from these terms:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ewho approved it?\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eunder what authority?\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ewhen?\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eYour reply supplies a retrospective excuse for withholding control, 2 years after the fact. But it supplies no authorization and no transparent declaration at the time\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eYou exercised these powers frequently. The record includes changing the registry’s fee recipient from Stewardship to ERIS and,separately, moving Treasury migration administration between ERIS wallets\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCollective oversight is non-existent if the person being overseen is misrepresenting control handovers and taking personal decisions about who receives control\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eYour denial of voting coordination also deflects from the points raised\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA272 expliclty proposed converting the board to a 2 of 3. You and MB supported it. It’s effect would be to make 2 approvals sufficient, despite your ongoing financial relationship (which is proven onchain), without requiring anyone outside your pairing to consent\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEven in a situation where there is not coordination, there is no safeguard here against misuse\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe suggestion is simple: will you make it a binding condition that any removal that does occur is only done so with an approved arrangement preventing you and MB becoming sufficient authority alone\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eI support investigation of every director. This involves payments, financial non-disclosure, performance, conflicts, misrepresentations, withheld control, security decisions, retained powers and more. This includes you\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDemands for identity and appeals to loyalty have nothing to do with the essential facts: your published commitments, your documented financial relationships and payments, their related financial non-disclosures, nor the effect of A272\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eYou are asking the community to blindly trust a future process that could remove a director, wile offering no protection against you and MB\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll while overtly defending your own decision to withhold admin/ownership rights despite your public commitments, without identifying any approval or disclosure changing those commitments\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePut your own conduct within the same explicit review mandate\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eValidators should fully reject this package before sufficient safeguards are in place\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eYou never had the right to make handovers conditional on your own approval of the people who were elected to oversee you\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe accountability relationship is reversed here: the person retaining power cannot reserve the right to decide when oversight is acceptable\u003c/p\u003e","post_number":56,"post_type":1,"posts_count":59,"updated_at":"2026-10-19T21:37:45.379Z","reply_count":1,"reply_to_post_number":null,"quote_count":0,"incoming_link_count":0,"reads":11,"readers_count":10,"score":37.0,"yours":false,"topic_id":47,"topic_slug":"phoenix-foundation-appointment-of-an-emergency-supervisor","display_username":null,"primary_group_name":null,"flair_name":null,"flair_url":null,"flair_bg_color":null,"flair_color":null,"flair_group_id":null,"badges_granted":[],"version":1,"can_edit":false,"can_delete":false,"can_recover":false,"can_see_hidden_post":false,"can_wiki":false,"user_title":null,"bookmarked":false,"raw":"You reply confirms the central problem:\n\nYou believe your own personal judgment entitles you to withhold powers after publicly committing to transfer them \n\nYour own TLA proposal specified transfer of administration after one month and transfer of contract ownership after three months\n\nIt contained no condition requiring the board to retain your confidence\n\nIdentify the decision authorizing departure from these terms:\n\n* who approved it?\n\n* under what authority?\n\n* when?\n\nYour reply supplies a retrospective excuse for withholding control, 2 years after the fact. But it supplies no authorization and no transparent declaration at the time\n\nYou exercised these powers frequently. The record includes changing the registry’s fee recipient from Stewardship to ERIS and,separately, moving Treasury migration administration between ERIS wallets\n\nCollective oversight is non-existent if the person being overseen is misrepresenting control handovers and taking personal decisions about who receives control\n\n---\n\nYour denial of voting coordination also deflects from the points raised\n\nA272 expliclty proposed converting the board to a 2 of 3. You and MB supported it. It's effect would be to make 2 approvals sufficient, despite your ongoing financial relationship (which is proven onchain), without requiring anyone outside your pairing to consent\n\nEven in a situation where there is not coordination, there is no safeguard here against misuse \n\n---\n\nThe suggestion is simple: will you make it a binding condition that any removal that does occur is only done so with an approved arrangement preventing you and MB becoming sufficient authority alone\n\nI support investigation of every director. This involves payments, financial non-disclosure, performance, conflicts, misrepresentations, withheld control, security decisions, retained powers and more. This includes you\n\nDemands for identity and appeals to loyalty have nothing to do with the essential facts: your published commitments, your documented financial relationships and payments, their related financial non-disclosures, nor the effect of A272\n\nYou are asking the community to blindly trust a future process that could remove a director, wile offering no protection against you and MB\n\nAll while overtly defending your own decision to withhold admin/ownership rights despite your public commitments, without identifying any approval or disclosure changing those commitments\n\nPut your own conduct within the same explicit review mandate\n\nValidators should fully reject this package before sufficient safeguards are in place\n\nYou never had the right to make handovers conditional on your own approval of the people who were elected to oversee you\n\nThe accountability relationship is reversed here: the person retaining power cannot reserve the right to decide when oversight is acceptable","actions_summary":[{"id":2,"count":2}],"moderator":false,"admin":false,"staff":false,"user_id":84,"hidden":false,"trust_level":1,"deleted_at":null,"user_deleted":false,"edit_reason":null,"can_view_edit_history":true,"wiki":false,"post_url":"/t/phoenix-foundation-appointment-of-an-emergency-supervisor/47/56","reactions":[{"id":"+1","type":"emoji","count":2}],"current_user_reaction":null,"reaction_users_count":2,"current_user_used_main_reaction":false,"can_accept_answer":false,"can_unaccept_answer":false,"accepted_answer":false,"topic_accepted_answer":null}